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Abstract
Identical classical particles are distinguishable. This distinguishability affects the number of
ways W a macrostate can be realized on the micro-level, and from the relation S = k lnW leads
to a non-extensive expression for the entropy. This result is usually considered incorrect because
of its inconsistency with thermodynamics. It is sometimes concluded from this inconsistency that
identical particles are fundamentally indistinguishable after all; and even that quantum mechanics
is indispensable for making sense of this. In contrast, we argue that the classical statistics of
distinguishable particles and the resulting non-extensive entropy function are perfectly acceptable
from both a theoretical and an experimental perspective. The inconsistency with thermodynamics
can be removed by taking into account that the entropy concept in statistical mechanics is not
completely identical to the thermodynamical one. We observe that even identical quantum particles
are in some cases distinguishable, and conclude that quantum mechanics is irrelevant to the Gibbs
paradox.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE GIBBS PARADOX
Imagine two gas-filled chambers of the same volume, separated by a partition. Both
chambers contain equal amounts of the same gas in equilibrium, consisting of the same
number N of identical classical particles with the same intrinsic properties. By “identical”
we mean that the particles have equal intrinsic properties such as charge and mass. Both
parts have the same total energy, temperature T , and pressure. The partition is suddenly
removed. What happens to the entropy?
According to thermodynamics the entropy remains the same, because the macroscopic
properties of the gases in both chambers do not change. From a thermodynamic point
of view, which means restricting ourselves to the consideration of macroscopic properties,
nothing happens. If A is the macrostate with the partition in place and B the macrostate
without it, the entropy difference is defined as
SB − SA =
∫
B
A
dQ
T
, (1)
where dQ is the heat transfer during a quasistatic process from A to B. Because the gases
remain in equilibrium, the removal of the partition is a quasistatic process. We have dQ = 0,
and hence SA = SB.
In statistical mechanics the entropy is usually taken to be proportional to the logarithm
of the number W of microstates that are compatible with a given macrostate: S = k lnW ,
where k is Boltzmann’s constant. When the partition is removed, the number of available
states X per particle doubles: each particle now has twice as much phase space available
to it than it had before.1 Hence, the multiplicity increases from WA = X
2N to WB =
(2X)2N , which corresponds to an entropy difference SB − SA = 2kN ln 2. This is the Gibbs
paradox: The entropy increases according to statistical mechanics but remains the same in
thermodynamics.
A traditional way of resolving this paradox is by denying that permutation of identical
particles leads to a different state. The real multiplicity is accordingly a factor of N ! smaller
for a system ofN identical particles than what we supposed previously. By the removal of the
partition the multiplicity now goes from WA = X
2N/(N !)2 to WB = (2X)
2N/(2N)!. With
the help of Stirling’s approximation it follows that, in the thermodynamic limit N → ∞,
WB = WA, which removes the discrepancy between statistical mechanics and thermody-
namics.
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However, classical particles are always distinguishable by their positions and trajectories,
and thus in classical statistical mechanics there appears to be no reason for the division
by N !. According to several authors, quantum theory is therefore needed for justifying this
solution of the Gibbs paradox (see, for example, Refs. 2–7). Identical quantum particles seem
indistinguishable from the start, because quantum states of systems of identical particles
must either be symmetrical under permutation (bosons) or anti-symmetrical (fermions), so
that the exchange of particles leaves the state invariant apart from a global phase factor and
the multiplicity N ! never enters.
If this reasoning were correct, then the Gibbs paradox would imply that the world is
quantum mechanical. It is difficult to believe that a thought experiment from classical
physics could produce such a profound insight. Unsurprisingly therefore, doubts have been
expressed concerning the traditional solution of the paradox. For example, some authors
have argued that identical classical particles are also indistinguishable, which would justify
the factor 1/N ! without recourse to quantum mechanics.8–11
In this paper we follow an argument that is closer to the spirit of classical mechanics.
We accept that identical classical particles are distinguishable and that permutation of two
of them leads to a different microstate. Nonetheless, we shall show that the Gibbs paradox
can be resolved within classical physics. The key to the resolution is the recognition that
the entropy concept in thermodynamics is not identical to that in statistical mechanics.
This observation will turn out to be sufficient for the resolution of the paradox: neither the
indistinguishability of identical particles nor an appeal to quantum theory is needed. On
the contrary, even identical quantum particles can sometimes be distinguishable in the sense
that is relevant here, so that indistinguishability cannot be relevant to the Gibbs paradox
even in quantum mechanics.
II. PERMUTATIONS OF IDENTICAL CLASSICAL PARTICLES
Classical particles, paradigmatically represented by impenetrable spheres, are the ex-
ample par excellence of distinguishable particles. At each instant of time they can be in-
dividually labeled by their different positions. Classical particles follow continuous and
non-intersecting trajectories in space-time. Therefore classical particles can be identified
over time by their different histories.
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Permutation of two identical classical particles produces a different microstate. Imagine
a situation in which there is one particle at position x1 and one at position x2. At a later
instant there is again one particle at x1 and one at x2. Assume that their respective momenta
are the same as before. What has happened in the meantime? There are two possibilities:
either the particle that was first at x1 is again at x1 and the particle that was first at x2
is later again at x2, or the particles have exchanged their positions. The latter case would
be different from the former one, because it corresponds to a different physical process.
Although it is true that the two final two-particle states cannot be distinguished on the
basis of their instantaneous properties alone, their different histories show that the particle
at x1 in one final situation is not equal to the particle at x1 in the other final situation.
Given these observations, how can it be that some authors deny that identical classical
particles can be distinguished and maintain that permutation does not give rise to a dif-
ferent microstate? One reason is that there is an ambiguity in the meaning of the terms
“distinguishable” and “permutation.” Consider the following statements: “Two particles
are distinguishable if they can always be selectively separated by a filter;”8 “Two particles
are distinguishable if they are first identified as 1 and 2, put into a small box, shaken up, and
when removed one can identify which particle was the original number 1.”10 These definitions
of distinguishability indeed imply that identical classical particles are always indistinguish-
able. The concept of “permutation” can similarly be understood in a way that is different
from what we have described. Consider again the microstate of two identical particles, one
at x1 and another at x2. If the particle at x2 were at x1 instead, and the particle at x1 were
at x2, with all properties interchanged, there would be no physical differences, neither from
an observational point of view nor from the viewpoint of theory. It is therefore reasonable
to say that the two situations are the same (see, for example, Ref. 9).
This is a different kind of permutation than the physical exchange we considered previ-
ously. In our first example the particles moved from x1 to x2 and vice versa. Trajectories in
space-time connected the initial state to the permuted state. In contrast, in the alternative
meaning of permutation, the exchange is not a physical process. Instead, it is an instanta-
neous swapping that occurs in our imagination, and thus it exchanges nothing but indices
and does not need trajectories.
A third sense of permutation is used by Saunders.11 One particle follows trajectory 1 and
the other follows trajectory 2. Imagine that the particle that actually follows trajectory 1
4
instead followed trajectory 2 and vice versa. That would result in exactly the same physical
situation. As before, this notion of permutation involves the consideration of states before
and after the permutation that are not connected by a physical process. A permutation
in this sense occurs in our imagination and exchanges an abstract identity (represented by
particle indices 1 and 2, respectively) which is independent of the physical characteristics
of the situation. This kind of permutation has no physical consequences and cannot be
significant for statistical mechanics.
At this point we conclude that if permutation is understood as a physical interchange
via trajectories in space-time, then permutations represent physically different possibilities,
in the sense of different physical processes that may be realized. However, if permutation
is understood differently, then the permutations may not be associated with any physical
differences.
III. PERMUTATIONS IN STATISTICAL MECHANICS
Let us now take a closer look at the question of what kind of permutations are relevant to
statistical mechanics – physical exchanges with connecting trajectories, or simply swapping
indices? Which kind of permutations determine the number of microstates W ?
Consider again two gas-filled chambers, each containing N identical particles. Before the
partition is removed the number of available states per particle is X . After the partition has
been removed, the number of available states is 2X . The reason is that after the partition’s
removal it has become possible for the particles to move to the other chamber. The doubling
of the number of available microstates thus expresses a physical freedom that was not present
before the partition was taken away. Trajectories in space-time have become possible from
the particles’ initial states to states in the other chamber. Particles from the left and right
sides can physically exchange their states.
In contrast, even with the partition in place we could imagine the permutation of particles
from the left and right sides, but such permutations are not taken into account in the
calculation of the multiplicity. Nor do we consider permutations with similar particles
outside of the container. In other words, the relevant kind of permutation is the physical
exchange, not the swapping of indices.
To completely justify the answer that accessibility via a real physical process, associated
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with a connecting trajectory, is the determining factor in the calculation of multiplicities,
we would have to consider the foundations of statistical mechanics. An important approach
in this area is ergodic theory, in which the probability of a macrostate is argued to be
proportional to its multiplicity on the grounds that the multiplicity is a measure of the
time a system actually spends in that part of phase space corresponding to the macrostate
in question. This argument makes sense only if the microstates in this part of the phase
space are actually accessible by physical processes. Microstates that give rise to the same
macrostate but cannot be reached from the initial microstate through the evolution of the
system are irrelevant for the macrostate’s probability.
Although the original form of the ergodic hypothesis (according to which all microstates
are actually visited in a relatively short time) has proven to be untenable, the basic idea
that accessibility is the criterion for the relevance of microstates is still essential. The
multiplicities that occur in more recent and sophisticated approaches to the foundations of
statistical mechanics are the same as those of the original ergodic theory.
We therefore conclude that the multiplicity of a macrostate in classical statistical me-
chanics is given by the number of ways that the macrostate can be reached by a physical
process. Permutations, corresponding to physical exchanges, represent different and real
physical possibilities. We must therefore not divide by N ! when calculating multiplicities of
macrostates of identical classical particles.
IV. EMPIRICAL CONSEQUENCES OF NOT DIVIDING BY N !
The foregoing argument for not dividing by N !, plus the relation S = k lnW , makes the
statistical mechanical entropy non-extensive. For example, after the removal of the partition
the total entropy is not twice the entropy each single chamber had before, but is larger by
the amount 2kN ln 2.
There are three kinds of objections against not dividing by N ! and the non-extensivity
of the statistical entropy that is its consequence: (1) it leads to incorrect empirical
predictions;2,12,13 (2) it leads to a violation of the second law of thermodynamics;4,6,14 and
(3) it leads to a discrepancy with the thermodynamic entropy.
In this section we address the first of these objections. The second and the third, the
Gibbs paradox proper, are discussed in Secs. V and VI.
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In contrast to what is claimed by some authors,2,12,13 dividing or not dividing the number
of microstates by N ! is irrelevant to the empirical predictions of statistical mechanics for
isolated systems. That is, although there is no fundamental justification for dividing by N !
on the basis of particle indistinguishability, a systematic division by N ! for all particles of
the same kind in mutually accessible states has no empirical consequences. This conclusion
follows because all empirical predictions made by statistical mechanics rest ultimately on
the probabilities assigned to macrostates. These probabilities are calculated with the help
of the fundamental assumption that in equilibrium the accessible microstates in an isolated
system are all equally probable, so that the probability of a macrostate is its multiplicity
divided by the total number of microstates. In isolated systems no particles can move in
or out, so that the number N of particles remains constant which means that not only are
all multiplicities decreased by the factor of 1/N !: the same happens to the total number of
microstates if we decide to systematically divide by N !. The probability of a macrostate
is therefore not affected, and whether we divide the multiplicity by N ! or not makes no
difference for empirical predictions.
Statistical mechanics does not only describe systems with a constant number of particles.
Systems in which particles can move in and out can also be treated, as is done with the
grand canonical ensemble, where the probability distribution can be derived by considering
a system with varying particle numbers as part of a larger particle reservoir. This reservoir
is again isolated, and the fundamental assumption is now applied to this larger system.
Therefore our conclusion that the empirical predictions remain the same, whether we sys-
tematically divide by N ! or not, also applies to systems in which particles are exchanged
between subsystems (in agreement with what was argued in Ref. 15).
Particle numbers can also change by chemical reactions, where the number of molecules
of a certain kind need not be constant, even if the system is isolated. For such a system
division by the number of permutations of the elementary constituents (in this case the
atoms) does not matter for the empirical results because the numbers of atoms from which
the molecules are composed remain constant, as discussed in Ref. 16.
To illustrate that the factor 1/N ! does not matter for empirical predictions, we consider
the example given in Ref. 13.17 Two containers, one of volume V1 and the other of volume
V2, are separated by a wall. Both contain the same kind of ideal gas, consisting of identical
classical particles. Now a hole is poked in the wall and the particles can move to the other
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container. After some time equilibrium is reached. What is the number of particles in the
volume V1 in equilibrium? From standard classical statistical mechanics, with the factor
1/N ! included in the multiplicity, the empirical prediction follows that N1 = NV1/(V1+V2),
where N1 is the number of particles in V1 and N is the total number of particles. According
to Ref. 13, if the factor 1/N ! were not included, an incorrect empirical prediction would be
obtained if V1 is not equal to V2: all particles would go to the larger of the two volumes.
However, as we shall now demonstrate, consistently taking into account the particles’
distinguishability does lead to the correct predictions using S = k lnW . In Ref. 13 empirical
predictions were obtained by calculating in what macrostate the entropy is maximal, and
we take the same approach here.
Consider a macrostate of the ideal gas, defined by the observable N1. As a constraint we
take that the total number of particles is N , so that N −N1 particles are in volume V2. The
multiplicity is given by
W = c V N11 V
N−N1
2
N !
N1!(N −N1)!
, (2)
where c is a factor independent of the volume and the number of particles. The factor
N !/(N1!(N −N1)!) is included because it is the number of ways N1 distinguishable particles
can be chosen out of N particles. With S = k lnW and Stirling’s approximation lnN ! ≈
N lnN −N , we find for the entropy
S = kN1 lnV1 + k(N −N1) lnV2
+ kN lnN − kN1 lnN1 − k(N −N1) ln(N −N1) + k ln c. (3)
In equilibrium S is a maximum, so N1 in equilibrium can be found by solving ∂S/∂N1 = 0.
The solution is N1 = NV1/(V1 + V2), which is the same empirical prediction as obtained
with the factor 1/N ! included.
Note how the non-extensivity of the entropy S = k lnW proves essential for a consistent
use of this expression for the entropy. When a hole is made in the wall, particles in volume V1
may exchange their positions with particles in the other volume, so the multiplicity increases
as indicated in Eq. (2). That means that the entropy becomes larger than the sum of the
two original entropies of V1 and V2, just as in the case of the Gibbs paradox.
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V. SECOND LAW OF THERMODYNAMICS
The second alleged problem is that the non-extensivity of the entropy leads to a violation
of the second law of thermodynamics.4,6,14 Consider again the two chambers after the parti-
tion has been removed. When the partition is returned, the entropy decreases by 2kN ln 2.
But the second law insists that entropy cannot decrease!
An important issue here is the nature of the second law in its statistical version: it will
turn out that to solve the just-mentioned problem we need to recognize that the second law
in thermodynamics is not exactly the same as the second law in statistical mechanics.
In thermodynamics the second law says that the entropy does not decrease if there is no
heat transfer to or from the environment. For the case of the replacement of the partition
there is no such heat transfer, so the thermodynamic entropy should not decrease.
In contrast, in statistical mechanics the second law expresses a probability consideration:
equilibrium macrostates possess a probability vastly greater than that of non-equilibrium
states, and therefore it is enormously probable that the system will reach equilibrium and
subsequently stay in equilibrium. The number of microstates corresponding to the equilib-
rium macrostate is virtually equal to the total number of accessible microstates W , which is
the justification for the use of S = k lnW as the entropy belonging to the equilibrium state.
That the statistical mechanical entropy S, with S = k lnW , does not decrease is a direct
expression of the dominance of the most probable macrostate. Accordingly, the second law
of statistical mechanics states that the entropy of a system goes, with overwhelming prob-
ability, to the maximum value compatible with the total number of accessible microstates,
and will not decrease as long as this number of accessible states does not decrease. The
statistical second law tells us, for instance, that without intervention from outside not all
particles will move to the same corner of the container. But it does not tell us how W may
change when the system is manipulated from outside, for example by placing a partition in
it.
VI. SOLUTION OF THE GIBBS PARADOX
The paradox is that upon removal of the partition between the two containers the en-
tropy increases according to classical statistical mechanics, whereas it remains the same in
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thermodynamics. What we have seen is that for classical particles the entropy should really
increase in statistical mechanics, in the sense that the number of accessible microstates W
does increase. This increase reflects the redefinition of the system, and of W that results
from manipulation from outside (the removal of the partition). The statistical second law
only plays a role here to the extent that it says that the system will assume an equilibrium
state which is compatible with this new and increased W . In principle, we could empiri-
cally verify that the number of microstates has actually increased by following the paths
of individual particles (we could in this way give empirical content to the existence of the
entropy of mixing.19) But this verification would require measurements on the microscopic
level that would lead us outside the domains of thermodynamics and statistical mechanical
predictions (in which the precise microstate is assumed to be immaterial). As we have seen
in Sec. IV, as long as we remain within the realm of the usual macroscopic measurements,
the increase of the entropy, for gases of the same kind, will not lead to any new empirical
consequences.
Is there a problem here? Can we not just accept that the entropy changes in statisti-
cal mechanics and remains the same in thermodynamics? Yes, we can. We only have to
take into account that the entropy is defined differently in statistical mechanics than in
thermodynamics. In statistical mechanics the existence of a micro-description is taken into
account as a matter of principle, whereas in thermodynamics this same micro-description is
excluded from the start. As we have seen, the consequence is an increase of entropy accord-
ing to statistical mechanics, but its direct empirical significance is only on the micro-level
and does not lead to any new predictions for macroscopic measurements. The difference
between the statistical mechanical and the thermodynamic definition of entropy makes it
understandable that the values of entropy changes in statistical mechanics are sometimes
different from those in thermodynamics.
There are no conflicts with the second law here. According to both statistical mechanics
and thermodynamics, the second law is obeyed perfectly. The statistical mechanical account
is that the number of microstates increases through intervention from outside (the removal
of the partition), and the statistical second law tells us that the system will subsequently
make maximum use of the increased area in phase space. Therefore, the prediction is that
the system will exhibit equilibrium values of its macroscopic quantities, so that on the
macro-level nothing changes. In thermodynamics this “fine-grained” consideration plays
no role: nothing changes and according to the thermodynamic second law the entropy
remains constant. Both descriptions are valid within their own context and lead to the same
predictions.
The same type of argument can be used if we consider what happens when the partition is
replaced. According to thermodynamics nothing happens to the entropy, because there is no
exchange of heat. According to statistical physics, there is a decrease of W and thus of the
entropy. But this decrease does not mean a violation of the second law! The decrease inW is
a consequence of the redefinition of the accessible phase space caused by intervention in the
system. The statistical second law remains valid, and predicts that the two subsystems will
fully make use of their phase space possibilities (which in this case means that equilibrium
will be maintained).
From a pragmatic point of view it is useful if thermodynamics and statistical mechanics
give exactly the same entropy values. We can achieve this equivalence by introducing a new
entropy definition in statistical mechanics: Replace S = k lnW by S = k ln(W/N !). For
systems in which N is constant this new definition makes no difference for any empirical
predictions, because it only adds a constant number to the entropy value. For the Gibbs
case, in which N does change, this adaptation of the definition leads to the disappearance
of the mixing term and therefore to extensivity of the entropy in the limit N →∞. In this
way agreement with thermodynamics is obtained.
It is important to realize that the introduction of this “reduced entropy” (as it is called
by Cheng20), is motivated by the wish to preserve this agreement: its justification is in
the reproduction of thermodynamic entropy values under all conditions, even though the
basic assumptions of statistical physics are different from those of thermodynamics. It is
certainly reasonable to change the definition of the statistical mechanical entropy to achieve
agreement with thermodynamics. There is nothing wrong with the reduced entropy if it is
interpreted from this pragmatic point of view. But it would be a mistake to interpret the
division by particle number factorials as a necessary consequence of a fundamental feature
of microscopic physical reality, namely the indistinguishability of particles of the same kind.
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VII. DISTINGUISHABLE IDENTICAL QUANTUM PARTICLES
In contrast to classical particles, identical quantum particles are usually assumed to be
indistinguishable as a matter of principle. This fundamental indistinguishability is supposed
to be the result of the quantum mechanical (anti-)symmetrization postulates, where permu-
tations of the indices in the quantum mechanical many-particle formalism leave a state either
invariant (for bosons) or change its sign (for fermions).
As we have argued, the permutations that are relevant to statistical mechanics are not
simply permutations of indices, but rather processes by which the permuted state is con-
nected to the initial state by trajectories in space-time. Quantum mechanics allows situations
in which definite particle trajectories through space-time can be defined. When the individ-
ual one-particle wave packets in the many-particle state have small spatial extensions and
do not overlap, we can identify them over time (and by Ehrenfest’s theorem they approxi-
mately follow the paths of classical particles). In the classical limit of quantum mechanics
such narrow wave packets come to represent the particles we know from classical physics.
Permutation of trajectories of such wave packets in the physical sense discussed before pro-
duces a different state, just as in classical physics. However, we have all been taught that
quantum particles of the same kind are fundamentally indistinguishable – so how can it be
true that it may make sense to speak about a physical interchange of them?
The confusion results from an ambiguity in how the particle concept is used in quantum
mechanics. Sometimes the indices in the many-particle formalism are taken to refer to
particles so that everything is symmetrical and all particles are in exactly the same state (as
follows from taking partial traces to define the one-particle states). But there is also another
use of the particle concept in which individual wave packets are taken to represent single
particles. It is this second way of thinking about particles, and not the first one, that in the
classical limit gives the particles we know from classical physics.19,21,22 Classical particles
emerge from quantum mechanics when wave packets become localized in the classical limit.
It is only then that the classical particle concept becomes applicable (see Ref. 22 for an
extensive discussion).
Narrow wave packets can follow trajectories through space-time, and as long as they
remain separated from each other, these wave packets remain as distinguishable as classical
particles. When a quantum particle represented by such a wave packet moves from x1 to x2
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and another particle of the same kind moves from x2 to x1, then the final state is different
from the initial state just as in our earlier discussion on classical particles.
As we have argued, the Gibbs paradox can be resolved without invoking the indistin-
guishability of particles. We see that quantum theory does not change the relevant char-
acteristics of the situation, so that quantum theory is irrelevant to the resolution of the
paradox. It does not matter if we switch to the quantum description of the gases we have
considered in the context of the paradox. If the particles are (approximately) localized,
permutation produces a different microstate just as in classical mechanics.
It is interesting to compare our arguments with those of Saunders,11 who regards even
classical particles as indistinguishable. According to Saunders there is one reason why
classical particles are generally assumed to be distinguishable: “. . . we surely can single out
classical particles uniquely, by reference to their trajectories. But there is a key objection
to this line of thinking: so can quantum particles, at least in certain circumstances, be
distinguished by their states.” We agree with this conclusion, but we do not see it as an
objection. Saunders’ conclusion is that “indistinguishability (permutability, invariance under
permutations) makes just as much sense classically as it does in quantum mechanics.” We
say the opposite: distinguishability often makes just as much sense for quantum particles as
for classical particles.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Gibbs paradox should not be interpreted as providing an argument for the indistin-
guishability of identical classical particles. Classical particles can be distinguished by their
different positions and their different trajectories through space-time. Nor does the Gibbs
paradox needs quantum mechanics for its solution: identical quantum particles can be as
distinguishable, in the relevant sense, as classical particles.
One way of resolving the Gibbs paradox is by recognizing that entropy and the second
law have slightly different meanings in statistical mechanics and in thermodynamics. In
thermodynamics the entropy has to be extensive; but this is not necessarily so in statistical
mechanics. It is possible, and even advisable, to make the statistical mechanical entropy
extensive by introducing a new entropy definition (the reduced entropy) that does not change
predictions as long as these predictions remain within the realm of thermodynamics. But
13
this convention has nothing to do with any fundamental indistinguishability of identical
particles.
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